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Downing: Dowing: Comity Bars Section 1983 Action for Unconstitutional

COMITY BARS SECTION 1983
ACTION FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ADMINISTRATION OF STATE
TAX SYSTEM
FairAssessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary
In a case that may have far-reaching effects on federal-state relations,
the United States Supreme Court has expansively applied the principle of
comity 2 to bar a section 19833 action for money damages against Missouri
tax officials for unconstitutional administration of the state tax system. The
decision imposes a significant limitation on the use of section 1983 as a
remedy for constitutional infringements, and may signal a future intent to
expand comity to bar any action in which a state has a strong interest.
The case arose when Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association, Inc.
(FAIR)4 and David and Lynn Cassilly filed a section 1983 suit in federal
district court5 against St. Louis County Supervisor Gene McNary, 6 alleging an intentional deprivation of equal protection and due process of law
by unequal taxation of real property. 7 Two practices allegedly violated these
constitutional guarantees. First, properties with new improvements were
assessed at about 33 A % of current market value, while those without new
improvements were assessed at about 22 % of their current market value. 8
1. 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981).
2. "Comity" as used in this Casenote is defined and discussed in notes 16-18
and accompanying text infra.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). For the text of section 1983,
see text accompanying note 30 infra.
4. FAIR is a nonprofit corporation formed by taxpayers in St. Louis County
to promote equitable enforcement of property tax laws in Missouri.
5. Section 1983 actions are brought in federal courts under the jurisdiction
granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
6. The complaint names several other defendants: St. Louis County Tax
Assessors Charles Schneider and Frank Antonio; present St. Louis County Director of Revenue William Skaggs and his predecessor, Edmund Pung; and State Tax
Commissioners Donald Williams, Stephen Snyder, and Tom Otto. FAIR v.
McNary, 478 F. Supp. 1231, 1232-33 (E.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 415 (8th
Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981).
7. The complaint alleged that defendants "maliciously, willfully, invidiously,
systematically, knowingly, and intentionally" violated plaintiffs' constitutional
rights. 478 F. Supp. at 1232.
8. 102 S. Ct. at 181. The Court explained that this unequal assessment was
allegedly the result of the defendants' failure to reassess old property on a regular
basis. The last general reassessment occurred in 1960. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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Second, property owners who successfully appealed their assessments were
specifically targeted for reassessment the next year.9
The Cassillys prayed for actual damages in the amount of the alleged
overassessments from 1975 to 1979 and punitive damages of $75,000 from
each defendant. FAIR sought actual damages in the amount of expenses
incurred in its efforts to obtain equitable property assessments for its
members. 10 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri held that such suits were barred by both 28 U.S.C. § 134111 (the
Tax Injunction Act) and the principle of comity, 12 and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed by an equally divided court
sitting en banc.1 3 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held that the principle of comity alone barred section 1983 actions in federal
courts challenging the validity of state tax systems. 14 The Court found it unnecessary to consider whether the Tax Injunction Act would bar such suits. 15
The principle of comity has been defined in many different ways and
used in many different contexts.' 6 In federal-state relations, comity has
generally been defined as the "proper respect for state functions" that federal
courts should exercise when considering issues that could more properly be
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. (1976). Section 1341 provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where
a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
12. FAIR v.McNary, 478 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (E.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 622
F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981). See notes 16-18 and accompanying text infra.
13. 622 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1980), affl'd, 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981).
14. 102 S.Ct. at 186.
15. Id. at 181. Although the Court did not consider the issue, it did find that
the Tax Injunction Act was not meant to engulf all situations requiring federal court
deference to state courts. The Court concluded that the principle of comity was not
restricted by passage of the Tax Injunction Act. Id. at 183. Lower federal courts
are divided on the question of whether the Tax Injunction Act bars suits for money
damages. Compare Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071,
1080 (7th Cir. 1978) (Act does not bar action seeking money damages), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1121 (1979); Bormann v. Tomlin, 461 F. Supp. 193, 195 (S.D. Ill. 1978)
(same), aff'd without opinion, 622 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1980); Southland Mall, Inc.
v. Garner, 293 F. Supp. 1370, 1371 (W.D. Tenn. 1968) (same); with United Gas
Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F.2d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 1979) (Act bars action even
when remedy sought is money damages); Kelly v. Springett, 527 F.2d 1090, 1094
(9th Cir. 1975) (same); O'Brien v. Dreyfus, 493 F. Supp. 476, 478-79 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (same).
16. For a discussion of various ways in which the principle of comity has been
used, see Wells, The Role of Comit in the Law ofFederal Courts, 60 N.C.L. REV. 59,
61 n.5 (1981). For the historical development of the principle of comity, see generally
Yntema, The Comit Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1966).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/13
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adjudicated in state courts. 17 Federal courts have relied on comity to defer
to state courts in suits seeking equitable relief against administration of
allegedly unconstitutional state tax systems."' In FairAssessment, the Court
gave two reasons for such restraint: (1) taxation is so important to the state
that any delay in collecting state taxes may harm the public by disturbing
balance"
the state government's operation,19 and (2) there is a "delicate
20
between two independent sovereigns to be maintained.
17. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). The Younger Court defined
"comity" as:
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in separate ways.
Id. The phrase "Our Federalism" has been used in connection with the principle
of comity in the context of federal-state relations. For an explanation of the difference
between comity and Our Federalism, see Comment, "OurFederalism"-TheLimitation of Younger-Samuels and theirProgeny on FederalIntervention in State Court Proceedings,
42 MO. L. REV. 559, 586-87 (1977). For criticism of the courts' recent extentions

of this principle in the federal-state comity area, seeJuidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
346 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 551
(1976) (Brennan,J., dissenting); NewJersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764,
767 n.9 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978); Hufstedler, Comityand The Constitution: The ChangingRole ofthe FederalJudiciaiy,47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841,867 (1972);
Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the FederalismSeesaw, 25 LOY. L. REV.
659, 687-93 (1979); Wells, supra note 16.

18. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932); Singer Sewing Machine
Co. v. Benedict, 229 U.S. 481, 485 (1913); Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City,
213 U.S. 276, 282 (1909).
19. 102 S. Ct. at 179 (quoting Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
108, 110 (1870)). The Court noted thatJustice Brennan had more fully explained
the reasons behind federal court deference in cases involving state tax
administration:
The special reasons justifying the policy of federal non-interference with
state tax collections are obvious. .

.

.If federal declaratory relief were

available to test state tax assessments, state tax administration might be
thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural
requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal
suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed,
with consequent damage to the State's budget, and perhaps a shift to the
State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency. Moreover, federal constitutional
issues are likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues of
state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state courts.
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 128 n.17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
20. 102 S.Ct. at 179. The Court also reviewed the application of the principle of comity in other contexts. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971),
the Court held that traditional principles of equitable restraint bar federal courts
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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Although comity had always been viewed as applicable only to equitable
actions, 2 the Court cited Great Lakes Dredge andDock Co. v. Huffman22 for the
23
proposition that it should bar an action for money damages in this case.
In GreatLakes, the Court held that principles of comity required federal court
restraint in a suit for a declaratory judgment that Louisiana's tax law was
unconstitutional. 24 Since Great Lakes was a suit for a declaratory judgment,
the Court in FairAssessment reasoned that comity is not limited to equitable
actions but applies to any action that "operate[s] to suspend collection of
state taxes until the litigation ...

[is] ended.

'25

After explaining how a sec-

tion 1983 action for money damages could have this effect, 26 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five justice majority, 27 concluded that it was barred by
comity.

2s

Although the Court extensively explored the history and purpose of comity, it said relatively little about section 1983.29 Because the Court weighed
from enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances. In Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610-11 (1975), the Court
held that Younger barred a section 1983 suit for injunctive and declaratory relief concerning the constitutionality of an Ohio public nuisance statute after state trial proceedings had been completed but before appellate proceedings had been exhausted.
The Younger and Huffman Courts stressed three factors that made those cases suitable
for the application of comity principles: (1) state court proceedings were pending,
(2) the proceeding was criminal, and (3) injunctive and declaratory relief was sought.
None of these factors was present in FairAssessment. The FairAssessmentCourt stated,
however, that these cases illustrate the principles that bar section 1983 suits in actions for money damages. 102 S. Ct. at 184-85.
Other cases have used the principle of comity to bar suits only when one or more
of the Younger-Huffman factors have been demonstrated. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims,
44.2 U.S. 415, 418-22 (1979) (pending proceeding, injunctive and declaratory relief
sought); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 435-39 (1977) (pending proceeding,
criminal nature, injunctive relief sought); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 328-29
(1977) (criminal nature, injunctive relief sought). In contrast, where there has been
no pending state court proceeding, the Court has allowed access to federal courts
even when the action was for injunctive and declaratory relief. See, e.g., Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 376-77 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711-12
(1977).
21. 102 S. Ct. at 188.
22. 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
23. 102 S. Ct. at 183.
24. 319 U.S. at 301-02.
25. 102 S. Ct. at 183 (quoting Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943)).
26. See text accompanying note 73 infra.
27. Justices Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor concurred in a separate opinion written by Justice Brennan. There were no dissenters.
28. 102 S. Ct. at 186.
29. The Court simply noted that section 1983 cut a "broad swath" by giving
a federal cause of action to anyone who had been deprived of his constitutional rights
by any state. The Court also noted that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961),
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/13
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the competing considerations of comity and section 1983, further background
on section 1983 is necessary to critique the court's analysis and conclusion.
Enacted shortly after the adoption of the 14th Amendment, the now
familiar language of section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac30
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
After an exhaustive review of the section's legislative history, the United
States Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Monroe v. Pape,3' concluded that a principal purpose of the section was to
afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be
enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges and immunities guaranteed by the32Fourteenth Amendment might be deniied by the state agencies.
Monroe revitalized section 1983 after many decades of dormancy. 33 Later
cases expanded it further.3 4 Other cases, however, have limited this expanheld that state remedies need not be exhausted before such plaintiffs could resort
to the federal courts, and that this holding was reemphasized in later Supreme Court
decisions. 102 S. Ct. at 179-80.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
31. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
32. Id. at 180. The7Monroe Court found several other reasons for enactment
of the section: to override any invidious legislation by states, to provide a federal
remedy where state law was inadequate, and to provide a federal remedy where
state law, though adequate in theory, was inadequate in practice. Id. at 173-74.
33. Monroe, for the first time, allowed a section 1983 plaintiff to bring his suit
in federal court in the first instance even though a state would have allowed such
suits in state court. Id. at 183. It also interpreted "under color of" state law as including acts in which state officials, clothed with authority of state law, misused
their power. Id. at 187. The impact of Monroe was dramatie-in 1960, about 300
suits were filed in federal court under all of the civil rights acts; by 1972, approximately 8,000 claims were filed under section 1983 alone; in fiscal 1976, more than
19,000 civil rights actions were brought in federal court. Developments in the LawSection 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1136 n.7 (1977).
34. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (section 1983 can redress
statutory as well as constitutional violations); Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (disallowing good faith defense to municipalities); Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978) (municipal corporation is a "person" under section 1983); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43
(1972) (specifically exempting section 1983 actions from the Anti-Injunction
Statute); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 676 (1963) (allowing section 1983 suit prior to initiation of state administrative proceeding). But see Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973) (requiring exhaustion of state administrative
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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sion by use of comity. 35 Comity must be viewed as the principal limitation
of federal court jurisdiction to hear section 1983 cases.
These conflicting principles represent attempts by the Court and Congress to advance two basic interests. Comity in the context of state tax systems
reflects the Court's notion that the state has a legitimate interest in the unfettered administration of its tax system because of its critical importance in
financing state government. 3 6 The language and legislative history of section 1983, however, demonstrate the congressional view that a taxpayer has
an interest in having his constitutional claims adjudicated in federal court
37
even when a state forum is available.
In reconciling these two interests, the FairAssessment Court was faced
with at least three potential alternatives. First, it could have held that comity does not bar section 1983 suits for money damages against state tax officials for the allegedly unconstitutional administration of the state tax
system. 38 Second, it could have held that such suits may be brought only
after exhaustion of state administrative remedies.3 9 Third, it could have held
that comity bars such suits altogether.4 0 A comparison of how each alternative reconciles the competing interests of comity and section 1983 will ex4
pose their strengths and weaknesses. 1
remedies as a precondition to section 1983 suit, at least where Congress has so
provided).
35. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,434-35 (1979) (barring section 1983 injunctive and declaratory relief against pending state child custody proceeding); Trainor
v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444-46 (1977) (barring injunctive relief against pending state attachment proceeding); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337-39 (1977)
(denying injunctive relief against state contempt procedures). See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
36. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
37. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra. For the provocative view that
institutional characteristics, technical competence, psychological set, and insulation from majoritarian pressures make federal courts better able than state courts
to decide cases involving constitutional rights, see Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1118-28 (1977).
38. See, e.g., Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071,
1079-80 (7th Cir. 1978). See notes 42-56 and accompanying text infra.
39. This is the approach taken by justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, in FairAssessment. 102 S. Ct. at 186. See notes 57-64 and accompanying text
infra.
40. This is the majority approach in FairAssessment. 102 S. Ct. at 178. See notes
65-80 and accompanying text infra.
41. A potential fourth alternative was to hold that section 1983 suits for money
damages against state tax officials for alleged unconstitutional administration of
the state tax system are barred by comity when there is a pending state administrative proceeding. There was such a proceeding pending in FairAssessment.
102 S. Ct. at 181. The Supreme Court has not yet fully addressed this issue although
it has been presented with the opportunity at least twice. See Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U-.S. 564, 575-77 (1973) (remanded on other grounds); Geiger v.Jenkins, 401
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/13
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The first alternative was selected by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton,42 a case
almost identical to FairAssessment.4 3 The central issue addressed by the court
was whether the Tax Injunction Act or the principle of comity barred a section 1983 suit for money damages. 44 The court in Fulton Market examined
the language of the Tax Injunction Act, its legislative history, and the principle of comity 45 and concluded that the "primary evil to be avoided...

[was] federal equitable relief which would disrupt the state's taxing
process.' '46 It found that an action for money damages would neither underU.S. 985, 985 (1971) (summarily affirmed lower court ruling). Lower courts have
taken different positions on this issue. Compare McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152
(2d Cir. 1975) (district court instructed on remand to determine whether comity
barred action in view of pending administrative disciplinary proceeding), with
Hodory v. Ohio Bureau of Empl. Serv., 408 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ohio 1976)
(failure of plaintiff to exhaust adminisrtrative and state remedies did not require
dismissal of action), rev'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 471 (1977). For a discussion of
this issue, see Koury, supra note 18, at 685-86; Comment, supra note 17, at 589-92;
Comment, Applying the Doctrineof Younger v. Harris to StateAdministrativeProceedings:
FederalRights FurtherJeopardized,8 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 126, 126-48 (1981).

Another potential alternative was to hold that even if the Younger doctrine encompasses section 1983 actions for money damages, certain exceptions to Younger
based on "bad faith or harassment" would allow such suits in any event. See Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
53-54 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971). Although the Supreme
Court has never found the bad faith exception to be applicable, lower federal courts
have. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Peek, 636 F.2d 943, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 916 (1981); Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 1972); ShowWorld Center, Inc. v. Walsh, 438 F. Supp. 642, 650-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER &E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §4255
(1978); Note, Limiting the Younger Doctrine:A Critiqueand Proposal,67 CALIF. L. REV.
1318, 1328 (1979). Since the plaintiffs in FairAssessmentalleged that property owners
who successfully appealed their assessments were specifically targeted for reassessment the next year, this could constitute bad faith and thereby come under the exception to the application of Younger principles.
42. 582 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978), noted in 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 284 (1979).
43. In Fulton Market, a property owner brought a section 1983 suit for money
damages against county and state taxing officials alleging intentional deprivation
of due process and equal protection by unequal assessment of real property. 582
F.2d at 1073.
44. Id.
45. Although not mentioning the principle of comity by name, the court in
Fulton Market quoted extensively from Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943), and Matthews v.
Rogers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932), when examining the underlying policy considerations of the Tax Injunction Act. These cases applied the doctrine of comity to bar
federal actions involving state tax systems.
46. 582 F.2d at 1078. For a discussion of how equitable relief is more offensive to states in tax matters than actions for money damages, see Note, Fulton
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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mine a state's ability to collect its revenues nor seriously damage the delicate
balance inherent in our system of government since no taxing process would
be enjoined, money damages are retrospective, not anticipatory relief, and
the construction of a state statute would not determine the outcome. 47 A section 1983 suit for money damages against a state taxing official, therefore,
was not barred.4 8 The court also held, with little discussion, that state administrative remedies need not be exhausted before a suit may be brought. 49
This approach fully accommodates the taxpayer's interest in having his
section 1983 suit for money damages brought in federal court50 but does not
withhold critically needed tax funds from the state during the pendency of
the suit.5 ' In cases like FairAssessment, the taxes have already been paid; the
continuity of tax collection is not disturbed. 5 2 This approach would intrude
only slightly on Missouri's interest in the unfettered administration of its
tax system. Unlike some states,5 3 Missouri law seems to provide that taxpayers need not exhaust state administrative procedures before challenging the validity of the tax in state court. 54 Missouri's interest in efficient tax
Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton: Limiting FederalJurisdictionin Section 1983
Damage Actions Against Tax Officials, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 284, 295 (1979).
47. 582 F.2d at 1078. This finding is directly contrary to the conclusion reached
in FairAssessment. See notes 69-77 and accompanying text infra.
48. 582 F.2d at 1079. It is unclear whether the court's holding was based entirely on its construction of the Tax Injunction Act or whether comity principles
were also used as support. By examining comity cases, see note 45 supra, and noting
that these cases enunciated the underlying policy considerations for the Tax Injunction Act, 582 F.2d at 1076, the court arguably decided the case on both grounds.
It appears that the court viewed the principle of comity, as applied to federal court
interference with state tax systems, as co-extensive with the Tax Injunction Act.
49. 582 F.2d at 1080. The court cited Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
as the principal authority for this holding.
50. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
51. The primary concern of Congress in enacting the Tax Injunction Act was
not federal interference with state and local taxation, but taxpayers litigating the
validity of their taxes prior to payment. See S. REP. NO. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1937).
52. For a discussion of the significance of this when the constitutionality of
the tax is being litigated, see Comment, The Tax InjunctionActandSuitsforMonetary
Relief, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 736, 751-56 (1979).
53. Illinois, for example, requires a taxpayer to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking a refund in state court. People ex rel. Korzen v. Fulton
Market Cold Storage Co., 62 Ill, 2d 443, 446, 343 N.E.2d 450, 452 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976); Korzen v. Hoffman, 20 Ill. App. 3d 531, 533-34, 314
N.E.2d 593, 594-95 (1974).
54. In Missouri, a taxpayer has two basic avenues to challenge a property tax
assessment. After notice by the assessor of an increase in his assessment, the taxpayer can appeal to the County Board of Equalization, MO. REV. STAT. § 137.385
(1978), and if not satisfied, he can then appeal to the State Tax Commission, id.
§ 138.430.
Alternatively, a Missouri taxpayer may challenge an assessment under Mo.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/13
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administration is thus not hampered by allowing federal suits before administrative exhaustion, since Missouri itself allows such suits in state
courts.55 The only remaining state interest, the desire to have federal constitutional claims against state tax officials adjudicated in state court, does
right under secnot appear substantial when compared to the individual's
56
court.
federal
in
claims
those
bring
to
1983
tion
A second alternative in FairAssessment was to hold that section 1983 suits
for money damages against state tax officials may be brought only after exhaustion of state administrative remedies. This was the position adopted by
57
the four concurringJustices in an opinion byJustice Brennan. With respect
to comity, Brennan noted that the power to control the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts is assigned by the Constitution to Congress, not the
Supreme Court. 58 The Court, he wrote, has no power to expand the doctrine of comity to defeat the specific grant ofjurisdiction given to the lower
59
federal courts to hear section 1983 cases. He argued further that comity
jurisdiction only in
has an established role in restricting a federal court's
60
equity cases, not in those for money damages.
REV. STAT. § 139.031 (1978), which provides that he may pay his taxes under protest and then initiate an action in circuit court within 90 days. The Missouri
Supreme Court has held that this provision permits an action for money damages
before administrative procedures are exhausted. Mesker Bros. Indus. v. Leachman,
529 S.W.2d 153, 155-56 (Mo. 1975). See also Xerox Corp. v. Travers, 529 S.W.2d
418, 422 (Mo. En Banc 1975). The court has also held that a petition alleging that
unequal taxation of real-property denied taxpayers equal protection may be brought
under § 139.031. Breckenridge Hotels Corp. v. Leachman, 571 S.W.2d 251, 252
(Mo. En Banc 1978). However, in State ex rel. Cassilly v. Riney, the court held
that a circuit court could not issue a writ of mandamus against state tax officials
until the State Tax Commission first had the opportunity to enforce the laws relating
to the property tax. 576 S.W.2d 325, 328-29 (Mo. En Banc 1979). The law on this
issue is not clear in Missouri. See C & D Inv. Co. v. Bestor, 602 S.W.2d 58, 60-63
(Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
55. If Missouri law is someday interpreted to require administrative exhaustion before access to state court is allowed, see note 54 supra, a stronger argument
can be made for requiring such exhaustion before allowing access to federal court.
One of the purposes of the Tax Injunction Act was to achieve parity between state
and federal courts. See 102 S. Ct. at 194. Also, requiring exhaustion would allow
state tax officials to correct any erroneous assessments, thus promoting judicial
economy.
56. Note, supra note 46, at 306-07.
57. 102 S. Ct. at 186 (Brennan, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 191. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
59. Id. at 189-91. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
60. 102 S. Ct. at 188. Brennan then examined the language and legislative
history of the Tax Injunction Act to determine whether it prohibited section 1983
actions for money damages against state tax officials. He argued that prior to passage
of the Tax Injunction Act, damage actions for unconstitutional state tax assessments
were an established feature of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 192. Since the Tax Injunction Act did not concern money damages, Brennan asserted that Congress intended
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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Brennan believed, however, that plaintiffs should be required to exhaust
state administrative remedies first. 61 He argued that, while section 1983
generally does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, congressional action demonstrated a policy favoring such exhaustion, and federal
courts should require it. He noted that one congressional policy behind the
Tax Injunction Act was to assure that federal courts exercise at least the same
restraint in dealing with questions of state tax administration as the courts
of the state that levied the tax .62 Where exhaustion of administrative remedies
is a precondition to suit for monetary relief in state court, he concluded, exhaustion should be a precondition in federal court as well. 63
This approach would slightly burden the taxpayer's interest in bringing his claim in federal court by delaying it. With regard to the state's interest in timely collection of tax revenues, 64 this alternative imposes no
burden; the suit itself is for refund of taxes that have already been paid. The
state's interest in administering its own tax system would be infringed
slightly, if at all, by the Brennan approach because the administration process would be completed before the taxpayer could resort to federal court.
The third alternative available in FairAssessment, and the one the Court
selected, was to hold that comity completely bars section 1983 suits for money
damages against state tax officials for unconstitutional administration of the
state tax system. 65 First, the Court noted that for a plaintiff to prevail in a
section 1983 action for money damages, the district court must determine
that the defendants' administration of the tax system deprived the plaintiffs
of their constitutional rights. This, the Court contended, would amount to
a declaratory judgment which is barred under Great Lakes. 66 In FultonMarket,
the court had rebutted this assertion by pointing out that" [t]he issue is not
whether a state statute is constitutionally valid but rather whether an official's
conduct violated established constitutional standards." 67 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Brennan distinguished GreatLakes by asserting that it, like
the prior cases in which comity barred equitable relief, stands for the prothat the federal forum remain available in these cases despite its enactment. Id. at
194. Therefore, he concluded, federal courts have jurisdiction over claims seeking
monetary relief arising from unconstitutional state taxation. Id.
61. Id. at 194-97.
62. Id. at 196-97.
63. Id. at 197. Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be a precondition to suit in Missouri courts. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
64. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
65. It should be noted that even under the majority's holding, such a suit might
end up in federal court through a grant of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court. See Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 605 (1975); Matthews v.
Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 526 (1932).
66. 102 S. Ct. at 184. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319
U.S. 293, 297-301 (1943).
67. Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071, 1078 (7th
Cir. 1978).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/13
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position that only relief designed to gain "an adjudication of rights68 in anticipation of their threatened infringement" is barred by comity.

Second, the Court felt that such a determination would be fully as intrusive on the state tax system as the equitable actions barred by the principle of comity. 69 The Court noted that because Monroe held that exhaustion
of state administrative remedies is not required in section 1983 suits,70 tax-

payers could bring such suits without first permitting the state to correct the
alleged constitutionally deficient practices. 71 This,72asserted the Court, would
exacerbate the intrusiveness of such an action.
The Court further noted that if tax officials were held liable under section 1983, it would have a "chilling effect" on the actions of other county
officials, impairing the state's ability to collect revenues. 73 While this may,
in fact, occtjr, the effect is precisely what was intended by Congress in section 1983.74 If the defendants were held liable under section 1983 for unconstitutional administration of the Missouri property tax, other Missouri
tax officials would promptly cease their unequal assessment of real property and targeting of those who successfully appeal their assessments. As
Justice Brennan notes in his concurrence,
"I would never have thought this
' 75
result something to be avoided."

Finally, the Court noted that the official's alleged unconstitutional actions may be the result of forces beyond his control, such as a limited amount
of resources. 76 If this is the case, the official would not be held liable in77any
event because such an official is entitled to a "good faith" defense.
This approach offers little more protection to the state's interest in the
administration of its tax system than the Brennan approach. 78 It is, however,
most abusive to the individual's interest in securing a federal forum for section
1983 tax suits. Although one of the purposes of section 1983 was to provide
an initial federal forum for plaintiffs alleging a constitutional violation, 79 Fair
68. 102 S. Ct. at 189 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 184.
70. Brennan disagreed with this assessment of Monroe. Id. at 194-97. See text
accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
71. 102 S.Ct. at 185. This intrusiveness would not be serious in Missouri,
however, since exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required before suits
are brought in state courts. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
72. 102 S. Ct. at 185.
73.

Id.

74. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
75. 102 S. Ct. at 189 n.8 (Brennan,J., concurring). Brennan asserts that the
rationale of Great Lakes was to avoid withholding tax funds from local authorities
until the tax is determined to be unlawful, not afterward.
76. 102 S. Ct. at 185.
77. Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071, 1080 (7th
Cir. 1978) (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)).
78. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
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Assessment virtually abrogates the taxpayer's interest in bringing his challenges
80
to state taxes in a federal forum.
In FairAssessment, the United States Supreme Court went further than
was necessary to fully reconcile the individual's interest in having a federal
forum for his section 1983 suit with the state's interest in the unfettered administration of its tax system. By barring such suits on the basis of comity,
the Court restricted the broad scope that Congress intended section 1983
to have. If section 1983 must be restricted, the more logical approach is to
first require exhaustion of state administrative remedies if the state involved requires exhaustion before allowing access to that state's court system.
After such exhaustion, a section 1983 plaintiff seeking money damages for
the unconstitutionil administration of a state tax system should be allowed
to bring his claim in federal court. If the state involved does not require exhaustion before granting access to state court, it should not be required before
81
allowing access to federal court.
Though it may appear to disregard a specific grant ofjurisdiction from
Congress, FairAssessment can perhaps best be viewed as a response by the
Court to increasing public pressure for restricting federal court jurisdiction.
Several pending congressional bills would limit federal court jurisdiction in
such areas as school-sponsored prayer, 82 abortion, 83 busing, 4 and equal treatment of males and females in the armed services.8 5 More pressure is coming from within the judiciary itself. Chief Justice Robert Donnelly of the
Missouri Supreme Court recently criticized the expanded power of the federal
courts and proposed a constitutional amendment that would severely limit
the power of the United States Supreme Cour t. 86 FairAssessment may signal
that the Court is responding and is ready to further expand the principle
of comity to bar access to lower federal courts in other areas where the state

80. The taxpayer may, of course, seek review of his case by petitioning the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
81. This means, however, that availability of section 1983 will depend to some
degree on the niceties of state tax procedures and will vary from state to state.
82. S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
83. H.R. 867, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
84. H.R. 869, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
85. H.R. 279, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). For a discussion of the constitutionality of these bills, see generally Auerbach, The Unconstitutionalityof Congressional
Proposalsto Limit theJurisdictionof FederalCourts, 47 MO. L. REV. 47 (1982). For Congressional criticism of these bills, see 128 CONG. Ri',C. S2225-69 (daily ed. Mar.
17, 1982) (remarks of Senators Baucus, Leahy, Mathia , Specter, Eagleton, and
others). But see Anderson, Government of Courts: The Power of Congress underArticle III,
68 A.B.A.J. 686 (1982).
86. Donnelly, The State of the Judiciary in Missouri-1982, 38 J. Mo. B. 515

(1982).
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has a strong interest.8 7 This expansion would, however, further infringe upon
the individual's interest in having his constitutional claim adjudicated in
federal court.
DON M. DOWNING
87. For a prediction of the future direction that the Court will take regarding
the balance of power between federal and state courts generally, and a prediction
of the role Justice Rehnquist will play in this area, see Fiss &Krauthammer, A Return
to the Antebellum Constitution-TheRehnquist Court, New Republic, Mar. 10, 1982,
at 14.
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